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The imposition of a global development
architecture: the example of microcredit
H E L O I S E  W E B E R *
Abstract. Poverty reduction is now a prime concern of global policymakers. Renewed global
efforts for poverty reduction are presented as the post-Washington Consensus. In this context,
I identify an emerging ‘global development architecture’ that entails new patterns of inter-
linkages between the WTO, IMF, World Bank, Regional Development Banks and Bilateral
and Multilateral Development Agencies. Through the example of microcredit and poverty
reduction I address the political economic implications of the emerging global development
architecture. I argue that microcredit (1) facilitates financial sector liberalisation and the
global trade in financial services; (2) functions as a political safety-net, containing or
dampening resistance at the community level to liberalisation policies and economic austerity
measures. The article critically probes the emerging global development architecture and
argues that it is incorporated into the reconfiguration of global political economy as a
strategy of ‘crisis management’. Normative discourses underpinning the post-Washington
Consensus are argued to be instrumental to efforts to legitimate the consolidation, ‘constitu-
tionally’, of what continues to be the Washington Consensus.
Introduction
Poverty reduction and development are now central concerns of global policy-
makers. ‘Pro-poor growth’ has become fundamental to globalisation for which ‘pro-
poor enabling’ policy environments are prescribed.1 In this context, it has been
observed that ‘[t]he emerging development paradigm breaks with previous inter-
national models’.2 This comes amid the expressed recognition by policymakers that
for both globalisation and development:
(. . .)1999 could well have been a turning point, from three angles: implementation of poverty
reduction strategies; promoting real and operational partnership, based on shared
responsibilities; and a systematic focus on the principles of policy coherence and governance.3
To be sure, 1999 did signal a shift to an ostensibly different political project for
global poverty reduction and development, suggesting a movement away from the
Washington Consensus and toward what has been identified as the post-Washington
Consensus.4 The term Washington Consensus captures the neoliberal orthodoxy of
the 1980s and early 1990s,5 the limits of which were brought to the fore in the light
of its adverse implications for social justice:6 the 1980s came to be known as the ‘lost
decade’ of development. In this context, the Washington Consensus was challenged
to respond to calls for ‘adjustment with a human face’.7
The post-Washington Consensus may thus be captured in terms of political
responses aimed at addressing some of the social limitations of the Washington
Consensus. But it goes beyond that: global institutional efforts have been stepped up
in support of the international development targets.8 Two key policy initiatives are
noteworthy: firstly, the decision to increase the link between international debt relief
and poverty reduction. Secondly, the decision to move beyond the debt initiative by
making ‘poverty reduction’ the foremost conditionality of international financial
institutions and bilateral and multilateral development agencies. In this context, a
broadly based global development agenda is emerging. The form of policy
restructuring for poverty reduction at the global level under the post-Washington
Consensus has pertinent implications for global political economy, and more
importantly for poverty and inequality.
This article critically explores the poverty reduction agenda9 of the post-
Washington Consensus. This agenda is central to the construction of what I identify
as an emerging ‘global development architecture’, which may be distinguished on
two accounts: conceptually, it has an explicit normative framing10 and practically it
entails a comprehensive structural reconfiguration of global order. The latter refers
to a consolidation, constitutionally, of a distinctive policy framework for develop-
ment at the supranational level, reflected in associated processes of global policy
harmonisation.11
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Promoting Growth, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
8 These include the commitment to ‘reduce the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half
between 1990 and by 2015’. See OECD, ‘Development Co-operation 2000 Report’, pp. 41–2.
9 See World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001–‘Attacking Poverty’ (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000); Dan Ben-David et al., Trade, Income Disparity and Poverty (Geneva: WTO
Publications, 1999); The Global Poverty Report, prepared by the Multilateral Development Banks and
the International Monetary Fund for the G8 Okinawa Summit, July 2000; more recently, develop-
ment and poverty reduction in particular, were placed as a core commitment in the final statement of
the G8 Genoa Summit (www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/2001genoa/finalcommunique.html).
10 This may be captured on the one hand in terms of discourses of ‘empowerment’, ‘emancipation’, or
‘poverty reduction’, and formulas such as ‘making globalisation work for the poor’. On the other
hand, those discourses must be situated and evaluated in the context of the political process in which
they are embedded.
11 A preliminary outline of such an agenda was evident in World Bank President, James Wolfenson’s, A
Proposal For A Comprehensive Development Framework (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).
The rules and norms of the emerging global development architecture,12 however,
I show to coincide—or rather to become unified—with wider global trends towards
policy convergence,13 in the logic of what Cutler refers to as the ‘unification move-
ment’.14 The norms central to the unification movement are those of ‘the law
merchant (lex mercatoria) or private international trade law’.15 Through a critical
engagement with the emerging global development architecture, I show the poverty
reduction agenda to be strategically embedded in global political economy. I demon-
strate how it is instrumental in efforts to consolidate the unification movement and
argue that its primary function is to link the unification movement at the
supranational level with local social policy and politics. Consequently, the rules and
norms of the global unification movement are extended to the level of individuals
within local communities. Thus, the emerging development agenda many be
conceptualised as an effort to ‘globalise’ the unification movement not merely at the
‘constitutional level’, but also at the level of establishing its reach and entrenchment
within the realm of actual social relations.
I substantiate this argument by drawing on the example of microcredit and
poverty reduction. Microcredit has salient local ramifications, as well as crucial
multi-level policy implications. It thus affords crucial insights for locating the
poverty reduction agenda in global political economy.
The example of microcredit and poverty reduction16
The idea that microcredit—as the road to self-reliance17—is an effective intervention
for the ‘empowerment of women’18 in particular, and poverty reduction more
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12 These may be deduced from an interpretation of prescribed development strategies, which include: an
institutional and legal framework which supports the emergence of an enterprise-based economy and
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functioning of markets. See OECD, ‘Development Co-operation 1999 Report’, p. 28.
13 See Hugo Radice, ‘Globalization and National Capitalisms: Theorizing Convergence and
Differentiation’, Review of International Political Economy, 7:4 (2000); Saskia Sassen, ‘Embedding the
Global in the National:Implications for the Role of the State’, in David A. Smith et al. (eds.), States
and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999); Colin Hay, ‘Contemporary
Capitalism, Globalization, Regionalization and the Persistence of National Variation’, Review of
International Studies, 26:4 (2000).
14 A. Claire Cutler, ‘Public Meets Private: The International Unification and Harmonisation of Private
International Trade Law’, Global Society, 13:1 (1999).
15 A. Claire Cutler, ‘Locating “Authority” in the Global Political Economy’, International Studies
Quarterly, 43:1 (1999), p. 59; Jarrod Wiener, Globalization and the Harmonisation of Law (London:
Pinter, 1999), esp. pp. 151–83.
16 The concern of this article is with the particular global institutional approach (as outlined below) of
microcredit and poverty reduction. It includes local operations that are informed and shaped by the
global institutional approach, either formally or informally, directly or indirectly.
17 This understanding informed the Hearing before the (US) Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives (105th
Congress, Session I). See the report of this hearing, Microcredit and Microenterprise: The Road to 
Self-Reliance (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997).
18 The Microcredit Summit in Washington DC in 1997 focused primarily on the potential of microcredit
to empower ‘destitute’ women. The Microcredit Summit Report, 2–4 February 1997 (Washington, DC:
RESULTS Educational Fund, 1997).
generally, has come to occupy the status of a hegemonic discourse.19 Locally, micro-
credit is purported to stimulate a transformation of the ‘vicious circle’ of poverty
into a ‘virtuous cycle’ of economic advancement. Microcredit has been endorsed
and adopted by the World Bank, Regional Development Banks and Bilateral and
Multilateral Development Agencies and United Nations (UN) agencies.20 In
February 1997, it was given global coverage through the Microcredit Summit in
Washington DC, which inaugurated an action plan to reach 100 million of the
worlds poorest families, and particularly the women of those families, with
microcredit by the year 2005.21 The Summit’s goals have been endorsed and are
supported by actors including the Councils of International Financial Institutions
and Donor Agencies.22 The UN has adopted a resolution to declare the year 2005 as
the year of microcredit.23
Explaining microcredit
Microcredit is the provision of small loans to poor individuals usually within groups
as capital investment to enable income-generation through self-employment.
Microcredit programmes may be complemented by the extension of microfinancial
services (for example, options for insurance schemes or savings).24 Microcredit
differs significantly from other targeted poverty reduction strategies in that it is
embedded in a commercial framework. Furthermore, it relies on the provision of
credit only. No advancement of skills through training schemes (capabilities
enhancement) accompany the packages. The approach has therefore come to be
termed as microcredit minimalism. Microcredit is provided in the absence of
conventional forms of collateral. Instead, group (mutual) guarantee mechanisms,
such as peer monitoring and peer pressure, are employed as a form of social col-
lateral. Interest rates are charged on a commercial basis. In some cases it is a
condition that Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or Microfinance Institu-
tions (MFIs) do not lend to the poor below a given commercial rate.25
Public discourses on microcredit have presented it as a panacea for poverty
reduction. Much of its legitimacy has also been sustained through its association
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programmes elsewhere. See Heloise Weber, ‘Global Governance and Poverty Reduction: the Case of
Microcredit’ in Rorden Wilkinson and Steve Hughes, Global Governance: Critical Perspectives,
(London: Routledge, forthcoming 2002).
20 Details of the integration of microcredit and microfinance at policy level can be found at the web-
sites of respective institutions and agencies.
21 The Microcredit Summit Report, p. 1.
22 Ibid., pp. 47–49.
23 United Nations, ‘Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly [on the report of the Second
Committee (A/53/613)]. ‘Resolution 53/197. International Year of Microcredit, 2005’ ( New York:
United Nations, 22 February 1999).
24 For the purposes of this article, microcredit and microfinance will be referred to interchangeably.
25 For example, a World Bank-supported apex financial institution in Bangladesh is clear on this policy.
See World Bank, Bangladesh, Poverty Alleviation Microfinance Project (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 1996), p. 51. In general, interest rates may range from anything between 25–40 per cent or
higher.
with the ‘success’ stories of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh,26 which has come to
serve as a model of the ‘virtuous’ outcomes of microfinance minimalism.27
However, impact assessment studies have challenged the conventional wisdom of
the poverty impact of microcredit, including the ‘success’ stories of the Grameen
Bank.28 The World Bank’s own studies have cautioned on the ‘band-wagoning’29 of
microcredit minimalism for poverty reduction.30 Such critical findings have not
translated into policy rectification, rather policymakers have reacted by changing the
terms of reference. Thus, where the widespread use of microcredit for purposes
other than investment for self-employment prevails, policymakers now refer to
‘consumption smoothing’. The equally widespread practice of poor clients borrow-
ing from one NGO (and/or MFI) to pay off the other is simply referred to as ‘cross-
borrowing’ or ‘over-lapping’. The taking of new loans to service repayment of old
loans is referred to as ‘pyramid loan’ systems. In this context, the question arises as
to what really motivates the microcredit agenda? 
Closer scrutiny suggests that microcredit may be motivated primarily by its capacity
to perform a ‘dual function’ in the global political economy. Firstly, as a financially
steered targeted poverty reduction strategy, microcredit, via its implications for policy,
facilitates financial sector liberalisation as well as extending the policy of trade in
financial services to the local level. Secondly, microcredit minimalism has a
disciplinary potential that renders it particularly conducive to functioning as a
political safety-net. In the latter case, it offsets ‘income-insecurity’ and attempts to
absorb surplus labour in growing informal sectors.31 Appropriated as a political safety-
net, microcredit via its disciplinary potential dampens or contains resistance to the
implementation of neoliberal policies at local levels.32 In addressing microcredit in
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26 A representative of Grameen gave evidence on the virtues of microcredit to the US Congress. See
Microcredit and Microenterprise: The Road to Self-Reliance. Grameen was also presented as a key
‘success’ story at the Microcredit Summit in Washington, DC, 1997.
27 See World Bank, Financial Systems and Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990), see esp.
pp. 98–103.
28 See for example McDonald Benjamin and Joanna Ledgerwood, ‘Case Studies in Microfinance, Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Microfinance: Past, Present and Future—An Essay, May 1999
(http://www-esd.worldbank.org/sbp/end/ngo.htm); Shahidur Khandker, Fighting Poverty with Micro-
credit (Washington, DC: World Bank, Poverty and Social Policy Department—unpublished research
document); Aminur Rahman, Rhetoric and Realities of Micro-Credit for Women in Rural Bangladesh: A
Village Study of Grameen Bank (Ph.D thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of Manitoba,
Canada, 1998); Aminur Rahman, ‘Micro-credit Initiatives for Equitable and Sustainable Development:
Who Pays?’, World Development, 27:1 (1999). These studies point to the adverse social implications as a
result of the credit intervention, such as an increase in violence at the community level, particularly
against women, an increase in child labour and further impoverishment resulting from a rising spiral of
debt. My own participant observation of microcredit and poverty in Bangladesh confirmed the critical
research findings. See Weber, ‘Global Governance and Poverty Reduction: the Case of Microcredit’.
29 Benjamin and Ledgerwood, ‘Case Studies in Microfinance’, see esp. pp. 10, 33.
30 Shahidur R.Khandker et al., Grameen Bank, Performance and Sustainability (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 1996), p.86.
31 For more on the role of microcredit in a rising informal sector, see the International Labour
Organization (ILO) World Labour Report 2000 (Geneva: ILO, 2000).
32 See n. 28 above; Microcredit, as a strategy to offset income insecurity (from the perspectives of both
the creditors and debtors) can often be tied to the political motives of creditors, with which debtors
may choose to comply if framed as the only alternative for meeting basic needs. These social needs
may be further instrumentalised to undermine or fragment social and political solidarity at the
community level, especially in a context of repayment crisis. The strategy also seeks to ideologically
entrench a competitive ethos for what Muhamud Yunus of Grameen calls ‘grass-roots’ capitalism.
Similar parallels of power and authority may be drawn with reference to the organisation of global
credit, see Randall D. Germaine, The International Organization of Credit: States and Global Finance
in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
terms of its ‘dual function’ (strategic embedding) in global political economy new light
is shed on the political economy implications of initiatives advanced to link local
political economies with global political imperatives.33
Contextualising microcredit: linking global and local political economies? 
Global efforts to advance particularly the financial sector imperatives34 of the unific-
ation movement via effecting policy changes may encounter multi-level political as
well as social constraints.35 This is because:
[t]he global unification movement privileges the private sphere and facilitates the further
denationalization of capital and the disembedding of commercial activities from governmental
and social control. Unification thus operates as a corporate strategy designed to assist the
reconfiguration of authority in the global political economy in line with the disciplinary
neoliberal agenda.36
The implications of the unification movement are social as well as political: They
can be seen to ‘blur the distinction between public and private authority in global
political economy’.37 This ‘obscures the political significance of private economic
power through the association of authority with the public sphere and its dis-
association with private activities’.38 Private economic power as public authority not
only undermines the ‘democratic provision’39 but also limits the parameters of how
entitlements to public goods and services might be secured.40 This shift in the nature
and form of governance is ‘reconfiguring political authority as significant decisions
over the disposition of resources are being devolved to the private sphere’,41 and
thus making it harder to sustain a ‘public’ challenge to private authority.
The social tension inherent in artificially abstracting the economic from the
political through a ‘public/private’ distinction,42 which is a ‘differentiation within the
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33 The case of Bangladesh is an illustrative example of how the dual purpose of microcredit functions.
In 1996 the World Bank authorised a poverty alleviation microfinance project for Bangladesh. This
project is also recognised as part of an overall strategy for financial sector liberalisation. See World
Bank, Bangladesh, Poverty Alleviation Microfinance Project, p. 15. Prior to this, in 1995 a report on
privatisation and adjustment in Bangladesh cited microcredit as a strategy to overcome potential
resistance to this agenda. See World Bank, Bangladesh, Privatization and Adjustment (Washington
DC: World Bank, 1994), p. 49.
34 The ‘unification movement’ is driven by sectors that include transnational insurance, financial
corporations and national chambers of commerce. See Cutler, ‘Locating “Authority” in the Global
Political Economy’, p. 72.
35 For more on finance in relation to the global public goods debate see Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, ‘The
Public Good versus Private Interests in the Global Monetary and Financial System’, International
and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 2:3 (2000).
36 Cutler, ‘Public Meets Private’, p. 48.
37 Ibid., p. 26.
38 Cutler, ‘Locating “Authority” in the Global Political Economy’, p. 72.
39 Robert Latham, ‘Globalisation and Democratic Provisionism: Re-reading Polanyi’, New Political
Economy, 2:1(1997).
40 See, for example, Underhill, ‘The Public Good Versus Private Interests in the Global Monetary and
Financial System’; Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty:
The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance’, Indiana Journal of Legal Studies, 6:2 (1999).
41 Cutler, ‘Public Meets Private’, p. 28.
42 A. Claire Cutler, ‘Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in International Law’,
Review of International Political Economy, 4:2 (1997); A. Claire Cutler, ‘Global Capitalism and
Liberal Myths: Dispute Settlement in Private International Trade Relations’, Millennium, 24:3 (1995).
political sphere’,43 may well need to be managed through disciplinary neoliberal-
ism.44 Thus, if the advancement of the unification movement proceeds through
neoliberal discipline at the global level, then its extension to the level of individuals
within local communities may also reflect this dynamic. In this context, the ‘dual
function’ of microcredit becomes relevant: its capacity to facilitate the advance of
the unification movement while at the same time offsetting its socially disembedding
logic via its function as a political safety-net. Its disciplinary component may be
crucial to the objective of extending the socially disembedding logic of the global
unification movement to the level of local communities.
The global framing of the poverty reduction agenda in these terms under the post-
Washington Consensus suggests an approach to development based on a strategy of
crisis management. The objective seems to be to manage what is perceived as ‘two
crises’: the crisis of global poverty45 and the crisis of global capitalism.46 Through
insights drawn from Karl Polanyi it will be shown below how such a conceptualisation
may misinform global responses to poverty reduction.
Polanyi’s double-movement: understanding the ‘two crises’
The two crises—the crisis of global poverty and a crisis of capitalism—are salient
features of contemporary global political order: they are at the centre of such
globalisation debates,47 as James Mittelman captures in terms of the ‘globalisation
syndrome’.48 Globalisation as a process may be conceived in terms of both the
expansion (and consolidation) of the unification movement49 as well as in terms of
increasing trends to conceive of a humanist global project based on universal rights
and duties, anchored in notions of substantive democratic participation.50 This
means that expectations of empowerment for the ‘better life’ are increased simul-
taneously as the unification movement is advanced. But the tendency of the
unification movement to operate in a socially disembedding logic may undermine the
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43 Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘The Separation of the Economic and Political in Capitalism’, New Left
Review, 127 (1981), p. 82.
44 Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’, Millennium, 24:3
(1995).
45 OECD, ‘Development Co-operation 1999 Report’, p. 119.
46 For discussion of this, see the collection of essays in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway (eds.),
Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (London: Macmillan, 1996).
47 See for example Samir Amin, Capitalism in the Age of Globalization (London: Zed Books, 1997);
Caroline Thomas, ‘Where is the Third World Today?’, Review of International Studies, 25 (1999);
Julian Saurin, ‘Globalisation, Poverty and the Promises of Modernity’, Millennium, 23:3 (1996);
Julian Saurin, ‘The Global Production of Trade and Social Movements’ in Annie Taylor and Caroline
Thomas (eds.), Global Trade and Global Social Issues (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 217–36.
48 James H. Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance (Chichester:
Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 4.
49 It is such a conceptual understanding of globalisation that is employed in this article, rather than
appropriating globalisation as the explanation of transformation. For more on this see Justin
Rosenberg, The Follies of Globalisation Theory (London: Verso, 2000).
50 Some of these issues are discussed in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.), Human Rights in
Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See also the collection of essays in
Morten Ougaard and Richard Higgott (eds.), Towards a Global Polity (London: Routledge, 2002).
emanicipatory project and thus result in the delegitimation of the unification
movement itself. This tension was brought to the fore, challenging the Washington
Consensus. It is in such a context that questions pertaining to the legitimacy of
globalisation increasingly came to global prominence.51
The two crises are neither new, nor independent of each other. In The Great
Transformation, Polanyi captured what is at stake in this context in dialectical terms,
and conceptualised it through the metaphor of the ‘double movement’.52 He referred
to the specificity of capitalism on the one hand to disembed the economy from
society, allowing the free market to self-regulate with reference to public goods.53
However, Polanyi observed that this ideal was a ‘stark utopia’54 that set in motion a
dialectical process comprising society’s attempts to recapture and re-embed the
economy within social and political control.55 The dialectic of the ‘double move-
ment’ was thus discerned to be the tension between ‘market society’ and ‘society
with markets’. The former refers to the ‘propensity of capitalist society to define and
to quantify social life in market terms’,56 the latter to socially embedded forms of
exchange predicated on reciprocity and redistribution.57
Although Polanyi’s insights are historically specific, it has been argued that the
analogy of the ‘double movement’ may be equally applicable to present circum-
stances.58 However, rather than an analogy it is better understood as a historical
continuum of the tension inherent in the ‘push’ factor of market forces and the ‘pull’
factor of the social life-world. In the contemporary context, what might have
changed to a degree however—since the post-1945 political order—is the role of the
state as a counterforce to protect society from the potentially adverse consequences
of the tendency of capital to become disembedded.59 Thus, for example, the
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51 One of the most visible politics of resistance was recently evident in Seattle. See the discussions on
Seattle by Mary Kaldor, Jan Aart Scholte, Fred Halliday and Stephen Gill in the Millennium, 29:1
(2000), pp. 103–140.
52 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston,
MA: Beacon Press, 1957).
53 ‘Self-regulate’ here does not mean the absence of political regulation, rather it attempts to capture the
political ideology of laissez-faire. For more on ‘disembedding’ see, Elmar Altvater, ‘The Growth
Obsession’, in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (eds.), Socialist Register 2002:A World of Contradictions
(London: Merlin Press, 2002).
54 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p. 3.
55 To be sure, conceptions of ‘politics’ underpin both the (neo)liberal idea of the market society, as well
as alternative versions of ‘societies with markets’. The political conception of the second movement
entails the more radical democratic idea of a politics of the life-world, which subjugates the logic of
market exchange to a solidarist and holistic ideal of emancipation and mutual advancement. (For
supporting arguments on the limitations of liberal political theory and particularly the predominance
of a narrow conception of liberty as negative liberty, see, for example, Anne Phillips, Which Equalities
Matter? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); C.B.Macpherson, ‘Berlin’s Division of Liberty’ in
Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
56 Stephen Gill, ‘Theorising the Interregnum: The Double Movement and Global Politics in the 1990s’,
in Bjorn Hettne (ed.), International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder (London: Zed
Books, 1995), p. 87.
57 Bjorn Hettne, ‘The International Political Economy of Transformation’, in Hettne, International
Political Economy, pp. 4–5.
58 Gill, ‘Theorising the Interregnum’.
59 See for example Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996). What I attempt to capture here is a shift away from a Social Democratic consensus. This
should not be understood an endorsement of state-centrism as the only possible framework for
realising solidarity-based conceptions of (distributive) social and political justice. These can be
conceived, for example, in accordance with transformed conceptions of political community as
advanced by Linklater in The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
trajectory of the transformation of governance enacted through the authority of the
state, relative to the imperatives of capital, since the post-1945 economic order may
be described as being from one of ‘embedded liberalism’60 to the ‘competition
state’61 and to its latest phase of the ‘cooperative state’.62
Thus, in the latest phase, the tension of the ‘double-movement’ can be captured
between the agencies of a transnational elite class63 (advancing Polanyi’s first move-
ment, the market) and what might be loosely defined as ‘global social movements’64
(counter-advancing Polanyi’s second movement).65 In this sense, it may be argued
that contemporary global transformation has merely transposed the dynamic of the
‘double movement’ from the confines of the Westphalian unit to the level of global
social relations.66 Thus, ‘solutions to the problems of security and welfare’ must now
be ‘found in transnational structures, global or regional’.67 It is in the context of
these trends and transformations that local social policy (particularly of low income
states) has increasingly come to be set and defined at the level of global institutions.
Deacon recently referred to this dynamic as the supranationalisation of local social
policy.68
Thus, in addition to providing an understanding of the tensions between ‘capital
and society’ under capitalism, what Polanyi’s insights provide is a backdrop for
locating and understanding the historical continuity of the poverty reduction agenda
of the post-Washington Consensus. In this sense, the specific example of microcredit
and poverty reduction can be best understood if situated in an historical process of
crisis management. For this a brief engagement with the crisis of the 1970s and the
evolution of the Washington Consensus is instructive.
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60 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the
Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, 36:2 (1982).
61 See Philip G. Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency and the Future of the
State (London: Sage, 1990).
62 This stage may be captured in terms of global drives for policy harmonisation as well as unification for
commercial trade law. The constitution of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) can be seen to
uphold the principle of ‘fairness’ in relation to capital. State membership of and commitment to the
WTO thus can be seen to reflect the stage of state ‘co-operation’ in relation to the imperatives of
capital. See also Wiener, Globalization and the Harmonisation of Law.
63 Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1998); Leslie
Sklair, ‘Social Movements for Global Capitalism; The Transnational Capitalist Class in Action’,
Review of International Political Economy, 4:3 (1997).
64 Fantu Cheru, ‘Transforming our common future: the local dimensions of global reform’, Review of
International Political Economy, 7:2 (2000). For an analysis of the limits and potentials of ‘social
movements’ see William Robinson, ‘Latin America in the Age of Inequality: Confronting the New
“Utopia”’, International Studies Review, 1:3 (1999).
65 The way this tension is in fact played out renders the practices of the proponents less sharply
distinguished than is implied by the constellation of a transnational elite class versus the politics of
social movements. This, however, does not mean that these practices themselves are not anchored in
this constellation in the way implied. Rather, it captures the tensions between the constituents of the
constellation in terms of social/political struggle.
66 Importantly, of course, this dynamic is as old as the capitalist state itself, pointing to the limitations
of conceptualising global social formation in Realist/Westphalian terms (see, for example, Rosenberg,
Empire of Civil Society; Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World
Economy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). Notwithstanding, social-political struggle now occurs in
qualitatively altered circumstances, with the site of political authority contested more saliently at
different levels and in manners which suggest trends towards a transformation of modes of social
political integration.
67 Hettne, ‘The International Political Economy of Transformation’, pp. 12–13.
68 Bob Deacon, ‘Social Policy in Global Context’, in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (eds.),
Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 213.
‘Crisis management’ of the 1970s69 and the genesis of the Washington Consensus:
advancing Polanyi’s ‘first movement’?
The genesis of the Washington Consensus can be seen to have its roots in the
capacity crisis of the 1970s. It has been argued that this crisis began ‘with the
erosion of the basis of postwar prosperity in the late 1960s (before the first oil shock
of 1973), leading to a collapse of opportunities for productive investment’.70 In
seeking opportunities for capital accumulation, the pursuit of the potential for trade
in services, and specifically financial services, emerged as a crucial objective of the
advanced capitalist states.71 These states were now post-industrial societies, with a
thriving services sector.72 As Ruggie observed then, ‘the blurring of boundaries
between domestic and international realms’ were ‘both hastened and deepened by
the growing significance of traded services’.73
Capacity crisis, trade in services and trade in finance 
In the context of efforts to advance the services sector, finance, as an investment
category in itself, was to be included in the ‘trade in services’ agenda by the advanced
capitalist states.74 The ‘decision in 1973 to abandon fixed exchange rates for good’75
set in motion the ‘formal’ transition from a restrictive financial order to a liberal
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financial order.76 One consequence has been the dynamic expansion of the financial
services sector that saw the rise of non-bank institutions engaging with banking
services and banks engaging with innovative financial investments.77 With reference
to the implications of these shifts in political economy, Robert Cox noted their
implications for the options and choices of national policymaking. He stated then,
that ‘[a]djustment to global competitiveness is the new categorical imperative’.78
Generally, representatives of ‘developing’ states have been reluctant to ‘adjust’ to the
new global imperatives, and have been particularly cautious of liberalising their
financial sectors. However, primarily, although not only, through the instrumental
role of particularly the IMF and World Bank, adjustments of state policy to the new
global imperatives have been facilitated.
For example, Samir Amin locates the ‘actions of international institutions after
1970’ in this context.79 He refers to the roles of the IMF and the World Bank in
managing the crisis of this period and specifically to the development and promo-
tion of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) by and through these institutions.80
If it can be argued that SAPs, to a degree, represent policy initiatives to advance
Polanyi’s first movement in response to the crisis of the 1970s, the counter-response
by the second movement was to follow.
SAPS, the Washington Consensus and Polanyi’s second movement
The implementation of SAPs increased rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s. As their
impact became more far-reaching a ‘politics of disquiet’ took shape at multilevels
and particularly at the local level.81 At this juncture, initial discernable indications
arose of the imminence of pushes in terms of Polanyi’s ‘second movement’. One of
the most evident manifestations of the potential of the ‘second movement’ to resist
the advance of the socially disembedding logic of the ‘first movement’ occurred in
Bolivia during the implementation of the New Economic Program (NEP) in 1986.82
To offset the demands of the ‘second movement’, the Emergency Social Fund (ESF)
for Bolivia was created. Microcredit minimalism was a key component of the ESF.83
The ESF approach departed from traditional public welfare programmes. It was both
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conceptually and in its practical design oriented towards the private entrepreneur—
which suited well the objectives of the NEP.84
The Bolivian ESF: the counter-response to the second movement? 
The Bolivian ESF was, from its inception, informed primarily by strategic political
considerations.85 The ‘dual function’ of microcredit minimalism served well to
sustain as well as facilitate the liberalisation agenda from the ‘bottom-up’. Analysis
of the ESF for its potential for replication concluded that:
[t]he basic principle of a financial intermediary that provides grants to local groups on a
demand-driven basis using flexible and well designed management strategies is more globally
applicable.86
The ESF approach has been replicated through the World Bank’s Social Funds
policy framework in comparable political situations elsewhere.87 The strategic role of
Social Funds (and safety-nets more generally) in disciplining the poor has been well
researched.88 There is evidence to support a causal linkage between the strategy
itself, as well as its methods of implementation, and pre-empted political outcomes,
at least in the formal sense. The ESF strategy was to become a crucial element in the
poverty reduction policy inventory of the post-Washington Consensus, particularly
since it has been acknowledged that the social costs of adjustment may not be a
temporary problem of transition but rather long-term.89
The ‘double movement’ and complex multilateralism: towards the Post-Washington
Consensus
The Bolivian experience reflected the potential implications of political contestations
for the implementation of SAPs: from a Polanyian interpretation, the politics of the
second movement was increasingly gaining prominence. In 1986, the IMF recognised
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the urgent need to proactively counteract such tendencies.90 These concerns were
incorporated into policy in the form of ‘confidential standard instructions’ from
1988 onwards,91 which stipulated that the IMF ‘in concert with the member country,
may seek a solution within the framework of the programme’92 to counteract any
potential social and political resistance. It is in this context, that a distinctively
reformulated poverty focus also re-emerged in the World Bank.93 The focus being on
‘. . . the poorest groups in countries that are undertaking adjustment programs’.94
The World Bank developed a ‘Master Plan’ which included ‘. . . involvement with
NGOs, poverty programs, women’s programs, and micro-enterprises,’95 These efforts
resulted in the adoption of the Program of Targeted Interventions (PTI) for poverty
reduction.96 In 1991 an Operational Directive on poverty (OD 4.15) was approved.
As targeted approaches to poverty reduction increased so did the appropriation of
microcredit.97 By 1995, ‘(a)bout 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries’ had
adopted ‘some version of the ESF model’.98 It may have seemed that the World
Bank was finally responding to calls for ‘adjustment with a human face’. However,
the increase of targeted interventions that accompany investment lending must be
understood in context.
Poverty reduction and financial sector liberalisation: legitimating coercive
convergence?99
Given that financial sector steering through poverty reduction had already been
institutionalised from the ‘bottom-up’,100 the stage had already been set to smooth
the process of policy convergence in the logic of the unification movement between
and within institutions. For example, trends in the global financial services sector
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have been reflected in the transformations of the original mandates of both the IMF
and the World Bank.101 In this context, Key has observed that ‘[n]ew relationships
and lines of communication are being established between the IMF, the World Bank
and the WTO as regards liberalization’.102
In keeping with its responsibility for financial sector development in accordance
with the institutional division of labour between itself and the IMF,103 the World
Bank adopted an Operational Directive 8.30, on Financial Sector Operations (OD
8.30) in 1992. It has been stated that OD 8.30 was a result of the 1992 Levy Report
which ‘challenged the Bank to find new ways to do business in the field of finance’.104
It set strict guidelines on the use of subsidies and advocated commercial on-lending
interest rates. However, due ‘to uncertainty about how to implement the guidelines
into practice’105 OD 8.30 was recast in 1998 as an Operational Policy (OP 8.30) on
Financial Intermediary Lending (FIL).106
In recasting its operational policy for the financial sector, the World Bank has
explicitly incorporated microcredit minimalism into it. Moreover, it is anticipated
that the World Bank’s forthcoming Operational Policy 4.15 (OP 4.15) on Poverty
will cite microcredit as a targeted poverty reduction strategy.107 In this sense, OP 4.15
will complement—and facilitate—the implementation of wider financial sector
objectives. Although not yet formally co-ordinated, through the PTI and Social
Funds lending modalities this has effectively been achieved in practice. Importantly,
by anchoring OP 8.30 (FIL) in the context of the microcredit and poverty reduction
agenda, the advance of broader financial sector policy objectives is legitimated via
the poverty reduction discourse.
The World Bank’s role in facilitating the ‘enabling environment’ for the financial
services sector via the microcredit and poverty reduction agenda is further exempli-
fied by the creation of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) in
1995. The CGAP, a multi-donor initiative, is specifically charged with a mandate to
facilitate the enabling environment for microcredit minimalism.108 The CGAP has
co-ordinated operations with the World Bank to achieve country-level (and regional)
commitments for financial liberalisation. According to the CGAP, this has resulted
in ‘expedited financial sector reform’ in several countries, including China, Brazil,
Vietnam and Togo. 109
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The implications for financial sector liberalisation at multiple levels, as a result of
policy co-ordination for poverty reduction through microfinance, are evident. The
‘level of global integration in financial services has proceeded far further than in
most other sectors of economic life’.110 Significant progress has been made on the
liberalisation of the financial sectors of developing countries.111 The contribution
of microcredit conducive policy adjustments towards this outcome must not be
underestimated.
It is against the background of the argument developed so far that I draw
observations about the relationship between the Washington Consensus, the post-
Washington Consensus and the emerging global development architecture. These are
addressed below.
The post-Washington Consensus and the imposition of a global development
architecture (GDA)
Under the post-Washington Consensus, the global unification of private inter-
national trade law is consolidated in terms of an architecture for global development
at the supranational level.112 This entails the harmonisation of policy across a broad
range of global institutions (such as the World Bank, UN Agencies as the UNDAF113
and multilateral and bilateral development agencies). The Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) has been commissioned to oversee this process.114 Key instru-
ments for its implementation are the new poverty-focused conditionalities of the
IMF and the World Bank: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).115 The
framing of the emerging GDA in terms of the global unification movement means
that its central function is best understood against the backdrop of the ‘double
movement’. It is designed to primarily reassert the supremacy of Polanyi’s ‘first
movement’. This can be discerned clearly in relation to central premises of the
emerging GDA. Policy prescriptions emphasise economic liberalisation and the free-
market approach as a prerequisite for other emancipatory goals.116 Thus, the DAC is
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explicit that the social and environmental agenda ‘must be associated with liberaliz-
ation’.117 The emerging GDA exhibits a close affinity with the rules and norms of
world trade law;118 indeed through the emerging GDA the development and world
trade agendas are conjoined. Here, the rules and norms of emerging GDA becomes
unified with the global unification movement, and then implemented through a
harmonisation of policy across global institutions. Hence, the argument that
attention must be paid, ‘concretely and systematically to policy coherence. (. . .)
Here, coherence means coherence between policies in the North and South alike, and
of all within the multilateral organisation.119
Thus, new forms of policy interlinkages emerge.120 Policy co-ordination at this
level and in its current phase can be seen to relate not only, but particularly, to
sectors (such as finance, health, education), which coincides with current imperatives
to advance the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the WTO.121
With reference to the financial services sector, financial liberalisation commitments
in terms of the GATS now provide the World Bank and the IMF with both criteria
according to which they draw up conditionalities for SAPs, and legal leverage for
their implementation.122 ‘Indeed, South Korea undertook to improve its GATS
financial services commitments as part of its 1998 IMF programme.’123 The example
of microcredit is again particularly illustrative in this context.
Microcredit minimalism has been given explicit recognition as global best practice.
The guidelines for minimalism as outlined in the ‘pink-book’124 reflect the degree to
which it is prestructured for all levels of the extension process of the global financial
system. Firstly, the guidelines are harmonised with the World Bank’s position on
financial sector operations. Secondly, NGOs as potential financial intermediaries to
the poor are subject to status revision by the CGAP and donor community for best
practice. In many cases NGOs are now changing their status legally from ‘NGO’ to
‘financial intermediary’. Thirdly, the language used in the policy literature on
microcredit is of creating the enabling environment to ensure access to credit for the
poor, reflecting directly the legal language of the GATS of the WTO.125 Crucial here
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is not the replication of language per se but rather the policy implications of the
legal interpretations for broader financial sector objectives. Implementation of the
GATS is controversial. The GATS is tantamount to direct investment policy and not
trade as conventionally understood. The microcredit minimalism and poverty reduc-
tion agenda can be seen to make a significant contribution to the removal of barriers
to capital mobility in terms of both direct policy implications as well as legitimating
it in terms of increasing access to credit for the poor; creating ‘pro-poor enabling
policy environments’. The argument advanced here is discernible in the British
Government’s latest White Paper on International Development, Eliminating World
Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor.126 By changing the terms of
reference so as to render opaque the actual social experiences implied by such
policies, any direct engagement with their cause and consequences in political terms
might be avoided.127
Poverty reduction as crisis management: a Polanyian after-thought
Through the example of microcredit, the article has traced the dynamic of the
poverty reduction agenda of the post-Washington Consensus back to the crisis of
the 1970s. Microcredit has been situated in a historical context of crisis management
of the advanced capitalist states. Even from a narrowly conceived South–North
political economy perspective, it is clear that the crisis management strategy adopted
then has not solved the crisis of capacity of the advanced capitalist states. Rather, we
have rising concerns globally, including in the US, with growing surplus labour
operating in the informal sectors.128 Thus, the implications of the poverty reduction
agenda must be understood in the historical context of global political economy.129
It is worthwhile to refer back to the initial framing of the poverty reduction
agenda in Polanyian terms. If the market was seen to move ‘into a groove’ once
again in the 1970s, efforts to reassert its supremacy came up against social and
political limits, especially at the national level of policymaking, during the 1980s. A
counter-response was shaped and was largely implemented by relevant global
institutions through disciplinary neoliberalism.130 This merely extended the dynamic
of the ‘second movement’ to the level of the ‘local’ or the ‘life-world’, prompting a
further counter-response focused on problems of micro-level risk management and
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thus setting the target for disciplining directly at the community level. Microcredit
has been particularly conducive to both advancing the logic of the unification
movement and offsetting its socially disembedding logic through its own inbuilt
disciplinary potential imposed in the social sphere.
Since the argument advanced here adopts a historical approach and is particularly
shown to link to the crisis of the 1970s, something needs to be said about the post-
1945 embedded liberal compromise. Although embedded liberalism ‘did indeed
constitute a restructuring of the relationship between markets and political
authority as Ruggie suggests’ it never ‘challenged the ultimate basis of the market as
a disembodied institution itself ’.131 As Lacher argues, ‘embedded liberalism’ as
conceptualised by Ruggie, did not work precisely because it differed fundamentally
from the ‘re-embedding’ of the economy in society in Polanyi’s sense. Re-embedding
cannot mean simply the restriction of the free-market, ‘but its complete subjugation
to democratic control by society, including the extension of democracy to the
economic sphere’.132
An analysis of the post-Washington Consensus poverty reduction agenda using
Polanyian insights helps not only to situate these recent trends within the broader
context of capitalist crisis management but also to understand what these insights
might offer for an emancipatory politics of development. A starting point is the
recognition that the crisis of global poverty and the crisis of global capitalism are
not distinct from each other, but are constituted as ‘one’, and must be understood in
dialectical terms. A reconceptualisation of the crisis in these terms, may explain why
even the best of intentions have either failed or resulted in further immiseration.
Understanding this means understanding that ‘[p]overty is not a contingent social
relation under capitalism; it is a necessary relation’.133
The non-recognition of the ‘crisis’ in these terms will mean that strategies in
response will be based on the ‘rejection or non-recognition of limits’134 to crisis
management. In this sense, the post-Washington Consensus—neoliberal politics—is
perhaps ‘the most evident manifestation of globalization’, and can be seen ‘not as
the resolution of capitalist crisis but as “the politics of the unresolved crisis” ’.135
The political implications of development as crisis management may well be regres-
sive, particularly if viewed from the perspective of substantive democratic politics.
Under the post-Washington Consensus crisis management continues to push against
its own limits.136 The social implications of this mean that the imperatives of the
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first movement are advanced whilst disciplining and preframing the politics of the
second. There is cause for concern. The way in which the post-Washington
Consensus policy framework is consolidated means that it actually aims at de-
legitimating the politics of the second movement. This is tantamount to an attempt
at ‘social closure’.137 Genuine political struggle—asserted through political contest-
ation—for development is undermined. The emerging GDA has no space or option
to accommodate contending political conceptions of development or contending
routes to development. Thus, the politics of the post-Washington Consensus may be
seen as an attempt to impose the GDA in a manner that seeks to consolidate its
inherent contradictions by pre-defining the ‘limits of the possible’ of political and
social action not only, but also through legal positivism.138
Although it projects a normative—emancipatory—response to the concerns of
the second movement, the post-Washington Consensus poverty reduction agenda
reveals a more complex structural reconfiguration of global political economy: it
seeks to constitutionally consolidate the key norms of the Washington Consensus on
a global scale. In this sense, the emerging GDA falls within the broader global
structural reconfiguration of what Gill defines as ‘new constitutionalism’.139 But it is
more than this: it also seeks to confer legitimacy for the unification movement
against the backdrop of a poverty reduction discourse. What is meant here, is that
the normative discourse seeks to legitimate actual practices of discipline and
domination which are extended through the poverty reduction strategies. This
discourse speaks primarily to the concerns and interests of the dominant classes as
they are ‘generally required to normatively justify to themselves and the other
members of society the existing social order from which they receive their
privileges’.140 At the same time, the actual practices aim at undermining the
articulation of the ‘consciousness of injustice’ of the dominated. Preserving the
democratic provision is important, as is closer scrutiny of the poverty and inequality
implications of the post-Washington Consensus. This is important, as without it,
as Altvater has argued through a succinct engagement with the logic of growth, ‘the
illusory faith in “growth triumphant” is bound to live on . . . while failing to
overcome the crisis. . . . and the poor will remain poor and grow even more
numerous’.141 At least for now, the poverty reduction agenda of the post-
Washington Consensus is committed to restaging the ‘modern tragedy’.142
Global development architecture and microcredit 555
137 See Ronen Palen, ‘Global Governance and Social Closure or Who Is to Be Governed in an Era of
Global Governance’, in Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.), Approaches to Global
Governance Theory (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999).
138 The PRSPs are illustrative of this. See Weber, ‘The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and “New
Constitutionalism”.
139 Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’, see pp. 412–15.
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account of how the articulation by the dominated, of their ‘consciousness of injustice’ (a concept he
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